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Abstract 
Using a panel dataset from 1980 to 2000 this paper analyzes the determinants of 
income inequality in Latin American countries with special attention paid to education, 
health, and social security expenditures. I build on previous research by solving for the 
endogeneity of the social spending variables in the income inequality equation. This 
study undertakes 2SLS and GMM methods in order to control for the correlation of some 
of the regressors with the disturbance term. While government expenditure affects 
inequality, an increase in inequality may be related to social, economic and political 
changes that can also affect government expenditures. Therefore, social spending is 
potentially endogenous in the inequality regression and, unless this source of 
endogeneity is accounted for, the estimated parameters will be not consistent. Results 
show that social spending variables are endogenous with income inequality index. Once 
endogeneity is controlled for, education and health expenditures have a negative effect 
on income inequality, while social security expenditures have no effect on income 
inequality. I also find that models that do not take into account endogeneity of social 
spending variables overestimate the effects of education and health spending. 
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The Effect of Social Spending on Income Inequality: 
An Analysis for Latin American Countries. 
 
"Latin America is highly unequal with respect to incomes, and also exhibits unequal 
access to education, health, water and electricity, as well as huge disparities in voice, 
assets and opportunities. This inequality slows the pace of poverty reduction, and 
undermines the development process itself” (World Bank, 2004).   
 
Introduction 
There is strong evidence that Latin America and the Caribbean form the region 
with the highest average level of inequality and particularly with the highest 
concentration of income at the very top. More specifically, according to the World Bank 
(2004), the top 10 percent of income earners among Latin Americans earn 48% of total 
income, while the poorest tenth earn just 1.6%. The equivalent figures for high-income 
countries are 29.1% and 2.5%. Using the Gini Index of inequality in the distribution of 
income and consumption, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) found that Latin America and the Caribbean, from the 1970s 
through the 1990s, measured nearly 10 points more unequal than Asia, 17.5 points more 
unequal than the 30 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and 20.4 points more unequal than Eastern Europe.  
The income distribution in Latin America has varied little over recent decades, 
despite big changes in economic policies. Londoño and Székely (1998) using data from 
household surveys showed that income inequality across Latin America as a whole 
declined slightly in the 1970s, increased during the 1980s due the debt-crisis and a 
sharp increase of inflation in a number of countries, and showed no clear pattern in the 
1990s. 
The concern about income distribution in Latin America is increasing, and it is not 
clear if the economic model now being followed in Latin America is making matters 
better or worse, at least in terms of income inequality (Morley, 2001). On one hand, 
some reforms such as opening national borders, decentralization efforts, privatization of 
state enterprises, and shifting away from progressive income tax systems to broad-
based taxes on consumption might be expected to shift the distribution of income even 
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more toward the rich. On the other hand, the considerable increases in social spending 
and broad coverage of public education in most of Latin American countries might be an 
effective instrument of distribution of income toward the poor.  
Using a panel dataset from 1980 to 2000 this paper analyzes the determinants of 
income inequality in Latin American countries with special attention paid to education, 
health, and social security expenditures. I built on previous research by solving for the 
endogeneity of the social spending variables in the income inequality equation. This 
study undertakes 2SLS and GMM models in order to control for the correlation of some 
of the regressors with the disturbance term. While government expenditure affects 
inequality, an increase in inequality is related to social, economic and political changes 
that can also affect government expenditures. Therefore, social spending is potentially 
endogenous in the inequality regression and, unless this source of endogeneity is 
accounted for, the estimated parameters may be inconsistent. In addition, most of the 
variables that determine income inequality are also determinants of social expenditure. 
Results show that social spending variables are endogenous with income inequality 
index. Once endogeneity is controlled for, education and health expenditures have a 
negative effect on income inequality, and social security expenditures have no effect on 
income inequality. Results also show that models that don‟t take into account 
endogeneity of the social spending variables overestimate the effects of education and 
health spending. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I first summarize previous 
research concerning income inequality in Latin American countries. I then discuss the 
literature concerning the determinants of income inequality, paying special attention to 
social spending factors. The data and econometric model are described in the third part 
of the paper, with an emphasis on endogeneity problems of social spending.  Results 
and conclusions are presented in parts four and five respectively.  
Inequality in Latin American Countries 
Why is Latin America so unequal? Lloyd-Sherlock‟s (2000), Morley (2001), the 
World Bank (De Ferranti et al., 2004) offer the most comprehensive analysis of the 
determinants of unequal distribution of income in Latin American countries. Surprisingly, 
to the best of my knowledge, no cross-country econometric models have addressed the 
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problem of endogeneity of the right hand side variables of the income inequality equation 
for Latin American countries.  
Lloyd-Sherlock‟s gave a descriptive analysis of the level of inequality in Latin 
America. He emphasizes that while the overall levels of social spending are much higher 
than in most of Asia, the patterns of government budget allocations are very different in 
the two regions: education is the dominant sector in Asia, while social security 
dominates in Latin America. In addition, low income groups in Latin America are often 
excluded from many areas of public welfare because of the poor administrative capacity 
of the government and there are severe problems of access and quality for important 
social services in Latin America such as education and public healthcare.  
According to the World Bank, inequality in Latin America is mainly due to the 
interlocking effects of four things: access to education is unequal; the earnings of 
educated people are disproportionately high; the poor have more children with whom 
they must share their income; and targeting of public spending is ineffective. De Ferranti 
et al. (2004) evaluate the effect an extensive range of variables including economic, 
demographic, and political determinants on income equality, but a limitation of this 
important work is that they do not use present regression analysis. They contend that 
the correlation across countries between educational and income inequality is clearly 
positive and significant.  
Morley identifies three central factors that help explain Latin America‟s high level 
of inequality. First, Latin America has a highly unequal distribution of education and the 
highest skill differentials for university graduates in the world. That is, Latin America let 
most of its young cohorts drop out after primary school, using the money saved at the 
secondary school level to expand university education. Since it is mainly the poor who 
drop out of school, educational inequality rose in the 1990s in every country in the 
region, except Brazil. Second, the combination of a highly skewed distribution of land 
and an increase in the growth rate of the labor force in recent decades has driven down 
the relative wage of the unskilled. Rural-urban migration in the twentieth century reduced 
the pressure in the countryside, but at the cost of transferring inequality and low wages 
for the unskilled to the urban sector. The combination of an unequal distribution of land, 
rising population growth rates and a failure of the education system to absorb and 
educate the young has left the region with an oversupply of poorly educated workers. 
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Third, the unusually large gap between the average incomes of the rich and those 
further down the income pyramid adds to inequality.  
Morley used data for sixteen countries in Latin America from 1960 to 1997, 
including national income, inflation, education, economic reform indices, and land 
distribution as determinants of income distribution. He used two different samples, one 
for levels and the other for changes in the distribution, and estimated both fixed and 
random effects model. He found that income is significant and has the inverted U-shape 
that Kuznets predicted, but that this relation has been shifting in a regressive direction 
over time. He concludes that giving new entrants to the labor force more education at 
any level is progressive, but countries will get a much bigger reduction in inequality if 
they start at the bottom, universalizing the coverage of primary education and then 
broadening the coverage of secondary and university education.  Finally, he found that 
tax reform is unambiguously regressive, and opening up the capital account is 
unambiguously progressive. However, this study does not include social expenditures, a 
measure of democratization, and effect of openness to international trade, which are 
presumably important policies that may influence income inequality.  
Huber et al (2005) examines the determinants of inequality using a panel dataset 
for 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period 1970 to 1995. They use 
the Gini Index of income equality as the dependent variable for multiple regressions. 
They find that health and education spending has a negative impact on inequality, 
meaning that such spending reduces income inequality, while social security and welfare 
spending (transfers, primarily pensions) has a strong positive impact on inequality. They 
use robust-cluster standard errors in order to control for correlation among errors of 
observations for the same country. The problem with this method is that it requires the 
errors to be uncorrelated between countries, which could be violated if unmeasured 
factors affect the dependent variable in all units at the same point in time.  
Literature Review: Determinants of Inequality 
There is a substantial literature that examines demographic and economic 
determinants of income inequality. Economic development, globalization, economic 
freedom, government expenditure, education inequality, and democracy are variables 
that have been regularly associated with inequality.  
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The association between economic development and income inequality was 
first analyzed by Kuznets (1955) who found an upside down U-shaped curve. That is, 
increased economic development is associated with increased inequality at lower levels 
of development, but then shifts at some point beyond which increased development is 
associated with decreasing inequality. Therefore, we would expect a positive relationship 
between economic development and inequality since most of the Latin American 
countries are at low or medium levels of industrialization and only few have passed the 
highest point of the curve.  
It is of interest to see whether various indicators of globalization have a direct 
impact on inequality. Openness by both capital and trade flows have been examined in 
the empirical literature for their effects on income inequality but with inconclusive results. 
Barro (2000) finds that in developing countries openness to trade, non-protectionist 
policies, and smaller government are associated with greater income inequality. In 
contrast, Dollar and Kraay (2002) find evidence that free trade and open economic 
policies lead to increased equality in a sample of eighty countries that covers over 40 
decades. Milanovic (2002) finds a more complex relationship whereby openness in low-
income countries tends to benefit only the rich, but openness in higher-income countries 
largely benefits the poor and middle class.  
Alderson and Neilsen (1999) consider the role of foreign investment in income 
inequality using an unbalanced cross-national data set for 1967 through 1994. They 
improve upon previous studies by estimating random-effects regression models that 
control for unmeasured country specific heterogeneity to investigate the effects of 
foreign capital penetration on inequality (measured as the Gini coefficient) against the 
background of an internal-developmental model of inequality. They conclude that the 
relationship between income inequality and investment dependence should be revised in 
light of an investment-development path relating the inflow and outflow of foreign capital 
to economic development. 
Rudra (2004) also investigates the relationship between openness, government 
expenditures, and income distribution using a panel data set for 35 less developed 
countries from 1972-1996. She finds that openness has a much more severe impact on 
inequality in developing nations. Only education spending helps mitigate the adverse 
effect of openness on income inequality in poorer countries, while spending on 
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healthcare, social security and welfare do not. She also finds that income distribution 
tends to be much more sensitive to trade flows in developing countries than in more 
industrialized nations. Her results indicate that increasing amounts of trade worsen 
income distribution in the developing world if the government does not engage in certain 
types of pro-poor social spending to alleviate it. Capital flows, in contrast to trade flows, 
have a minimal effect on inequality in both sets of countries. 
Population growth and population under 15 years of age are generally 
expected to push up the level of inequality. The oversupply of unskilled young workers 
depresses lower incomes and increase wage differentials (Alderson and Nielsen, 1999). 
Aged population is also expected to have a positive impact on inequality. The argument 
is that higher elderly population suggests lower productivity, lower savings rates, and 
smaller intergenerational transfer of income (Deaton and Paxson, 1997).  
Urbanization can also affect income distribution. Growth of the urban population 
contributes to a higher middle class, and more employment (Boschi, 1987). Similarly, the 
larger the proportion of the labor force in agriculture, the higher the degree of inequality. 
As the movement of the labor force shifts from agriculture to the urban sector, low-paid 
rural jobs become less important and inequality is expected to decrease. Deininger and 
Squire (1996) showed that inequality in the rural samples in Latin America is generally 
higher.  
It is expected that democratic nations will exhibit a more favorable distribution of 
income. Some studies contend that more authoritarian regimes cause income 
distribution to be skewed because income will be concentrated in the hands of a few 
elites who hold political power (Muller, 1988; Burkhart, 1997; and Huber et al., 2005). 
Muller and Buckhard measure the presence of immediate presence of democracy in the 
year of observation. Instead, Huber et al. measure the strength of the democratic 
tradition and find a positive correlation with income inequality, meaning that the stronger 
the democratic tradition of country the more unequal the distribution of income.   
Research also examines the link between income inequality and various 
measures of education. Most studies find a negative relationship between income 
inequality and a country‟s average or median educational attainment. Enrollments also 
are examined for their effects on income inequality. Barro (2000) finds a negative 
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relationship between primary and secondary school enrollments and income inequality 
but a positive relationship between higher education enrollments and income inequality. 
The relationship between secondary enrollments and income inequality may be thought 
of as one which is inherently connected to development. That is, an increase in the 
supply of educated workers tends to diminish the gap in wages and, thereby, decreases 
income inequality. Morley (2001) finds that in Latin America the spread of education over 
the last 30 years coincides with a trend towards increasing income inequality. This is a 
direct result of the tendency to support only primary education rather than both primary 
and secondary education. In contrast, Shanahan (1994) finds no relationship between 
an expanded educational system and a country‟s degree of income inequality. 
The direct relationship between educational inequality (unequal distribution of 
human capital) and income inequality yields mixed results. Checchi (2000) concludes 
that when the distribution of educational attainment is accounted for, the relationship 
between attainment and income inequality is actually U-shaped. De Gregorio and Lee 
(2002) find a positive relationship between the two; whereas, O'Neil (1995) finds a 
negative relationship: “incomes have diverged despite substantial convergence in 
education levels”.  
The relationship between inequality and overall government spending as well 
as government spending for particular services have been studied but the results are not 
consistent across these various studies. Moene and Wallerstein (2001) use data for 18 
OECD countries between 1980 and 1990. Controlling the unemployment rate, voter 
turnout, rightist government, percent elderly and a lagged measure of expenditure, 
higher inequality is associated with lower social spending. However, Moene and 
Wallerstein omit differences across nations that could be correlated with both inequality 
and social spending, which could lead to seriously biased estimates of the effect of 
inequality.  Sylwester (2002) considers how education expenditures are associated with 
subsequent changes in income inequality within a cross-section of countries. After 
dividing the sample into OECD and less-developed-country subsamples, he finds that 
education expenditures are more strongly associated with falling income inequality in the 
former group. Rudra (2004) finds that while all categories of social spending help reduce 
income inequality in richer countries, the effects of social spending are much less 
favorable in LDCs. In LDCs, only spending on education reduces income inequality in 
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the face of globalization. Rudra contends that education spending mitigates the adverse 
effects on openness in inequality. 
In Latin America the evidence for the distributive impact of social spending is 
more mixed and tends to vary for different kinds of expenditures. Ferrati et al. (2004) 
indicates that education spending is progressive, health spending is slightly progressive 
or neutral, and that social security spending tends to be regressive.1 Deininger and 
Squire (1998) find that educational expenditures are positively associated with 
inequality, though causal relationships are ambiguous. Finally, Huber et al (2005) find 
that health and education spending has a negative impact on inequality, while social 
security and welfare spending has a strong positive impact on inequality.  
Data 
Using data from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), the World Bank‟s 
World Development Indicators (WDI), International Monetary Fund‟s Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS), and the Polity IV dataset measure of democracy, this paper 
estimates the effects government spending, and selected educational and economic 
factors on income inequality.  I use an unbalanced panel data set with 200 observations 
from 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries, specifically Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The 
data span the period 1980 to 2000. With only a few exceptions, the observations are 
annual.  
The dependent variable for this study is income inequality, measured using the 
Gini coefficient, which was obtained from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). 
This data set includes the often used GINI data developed by Deininger and Squire 
(1996). Using their data has the following advantages: it is possible to compare results 
with prior research, has an intuitive interpretation2, and satisfies particular standards of 
quality. Only “high quality” observations are included in the analysis. The drawback of 
                                                 
1
 Social security expenditures tend to favor the formal labor sector and benefits are unequally distributed 
since they are tied with earnings.  
 
2
 The Gini coefficient has an intuitive interpretation: is a measure between 0 and 100, where 0 means 
perfect equality and 100 represent perfect inequality in household and individual based distribution of 
incomes.  
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using this data is that there are several missing values which result in an unbalanced 
dataset. There are a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 20 observations per country. I use 
yearly data in order to make use of every observation and to capture the effects of 
annual changes. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the Gini coefficients of Latin 
American countries in the sample.  
Independent Variables  
I use the natural log of GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US dollars) as the 
variable for economic development, which is commonly used in the literature. This 
variable was retrieved from the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators (WDI). As is 
also common in the literature, I include the squared value of this term as another 
variable, to allow for the Kuznet‟s hypothesis of a non-linear relationship.  
Two variables encompass the measures of globalization in this study: capital and 
trade flows. These variables were retrieved from the WDI. Trade openness is measured 
by exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
measures net inflows of investment as a percentage of GDP. We can expect that the 
openness coefficients will be positive and significant.  
Per capita spending on health, education, social security and welfare are 
reported in the International Monetary Fund‟s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). An 
alternative measure of percentage of a country‟s public expenditures for each category 
above is used in order to test for robustness of the spending effect on inequality. One 
limitation of the expenditure data is it is not disaggregated for different levels of 
education or health. Therefore, it is not straightforward to predict a sign for this variable. 
We would expect a negative overall effect of government expenditure on inequality 
index. Table 2 present the means for the spending variables by country. 
I also include the following educational variables: gross elementary, secondary 
and tertiary enrollment ratio. According to the World Bank this variable is defined as “the 
ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown”. These variables were also 
obtained from the WDI. We expect education attainment to reduce inequality and 
promote economic growth. In Latin America, primary education has been universalized 
since 1970 for primary education, but not for secondary education, and so large 
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proportion of students drop out at that point. This explains the fact that educational 
attainment has coincided with increasing inequality in Latin American countries in the 
last 30 years. Consequently, we would expect a negative coefficient for higher education 
but a positive coefficient for primary education.  
The Polity IV data set is used to derive both measures. Democracy is scored on 
a scale of 0 to 10 (10 being the highest) and rated by: (1) regulation, competitiveness, 
and openness of executive recruitment, (2) executive constraints, and (3) regulation and 
competitiveness of political competition. For this analysis I apply both measures of 
democracy. Following Segura and Kaufman (2004), a democracy dummy variable is 
constructed by coding any country scoring at least 7 as democratic; otherwise, they are 
coded authoritarian. We expect the countries with the longer democratic traditions to 
have less income inequality.  
A measure of urbanization, the percentage of the population which live in urban 
areas, is included in the model as determinant of inequality. We expect that more urban 
countries have less income inequality. I finally test for the effect of the percentage of the 
population which is 65 and older for the model predicting social security and welfare 
spending and of the percentage of the population which is under 15 years of age for the 
model predicting spending on health and education.  
Other variables are included in the empirical model such as inflation, 
unemployment, debt, deficit, among others in order to control for economic effects. 
However, the estimates for these variables are either insignificant and with very small 
coefficients in the inequality equation. Therefore, these variables are dropped from the 
analysis. 
Model 
I apply the fixed effect method using time dummies and a decade dummy 
variable to control for economic shocks or other time specific effects. The decade 
dummy variable is particularly important to check the effects of the 1980s crisis on the 
model, particularly since social spending fell during that decade. Decade dummies are 
preferred to year dummies due to the small size of the sample.3 Fixed effects are useful 
                                                 
3
 Regressions are also estimated using year dummy variables however the results don‟t change 
significantively. 
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for controlling for idiosyncratic differences across countries with regard to inequality. 
Country specific effects are important in this model since most of the variation occur 
across units rather than over time. The intercept of the fixed effects model estimates the 
differences in inequality between countries and time dummy variables capture variation 
within them through time.  
The general regression model for the level of distribution can be written as 
follows: 
 
Where: 
 o  is a vector of intercepts that capture unobservable country specific effects 
such as: historical experiences, initial conditions, and cultural differences. 
 j is a vector of slope coefficients for per capita GDP and per capita GDP 
square. 
 k is a vector of slope coefficients for per capita education, health and social 
security spending. 
 l is a vector of slope coefficients for trade and foreign direct investment 
 m is a vector of slope coefficients for gross enrollment ratio for primary, 
secondary and tertiary education. 
 Xit is a vector of observable country characteristics which are hypothesized to 
have an effect on the income distribution such as population > 65 years old, 
democracy, urbanization, and level of decentralization. 
 p  is a vector of intercepts that capture time specific effects. 
 q is a vector of dummies which reflect the variance in methodology to 
estimate the Gini index (e.g., urban versus national surveys, household income 
versus income per capita, expenditure versus income). 
 it is the error term which is assumed to be normally distributed . 
In order to control for the causal relationship between social spending and 
income distribution, a 2SLS estimation procedure is used for the empirical analysis. 
Higher order moments of the spending variables are used as instruments for social 
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expenditure variables. This procedure was proposed by Lewbel (1997) due to the 
difficulty of finding data for exogenous instrumental variables. However, the validity of 
this technique relies on, among other things, the skewness of the data.  
A random effect model (REM) is also estimated. REM requires equal correlations 
among errors within units. Such an error structure would arise if unmeasured unit-
specific causes, such as methodical measurement differences or other unobserved 
aspects of the social structure of a country, affect the dependent variable in the same 
way at each point in time over the period of the data. Since this is reasonable 
assumption for Latin American countries, the REM strategy is a feasible method of 
estimation. 
Finally, a first differenced GMM panel data model is estimated because of its 
potential for obtaining consistent parameter estimates even in the presence of 
measurement error and endogenous right-hand side variable. Different assumptions 
about the presence of measurement errors and the endogeneity of right-hand-side 
variables will have implications for the validity of specific instruments. These 
assumptions can be tested in the GMM framework by the use of the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the determinants of social spending 
and inequality. Results of the social spending regression are presented in Table 4 for 
education, health and social security expenditures respectively. Table 5 presents the 
results for the determinants of inequality controlling for the potential endogeneity of the 
social spending variables. Three alternative models are estimated using different 
econometric methods: fixed effects, random effects, and fist differenced GMM model. 
Model 1 includes only socioeconomic4 and social spending variables. Model 2 
represents socioeconomic, social spending, and educational variables. Model 3 is a 
combined model utilizing socioeconomic, social spending, educational variables and 
sample dummy variables.   
                                                 
4
 Socioeconomic variables include economic development, openness and specific socioeconomic country 
characteristics.  
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Results  
The general regression model fits the data well, explaining anywhere from 45% 
to 67% of the total variance in the Gini coefficient over time and across countries. In 
addition, the estimates and significance of the coefficient appear to be robust and 
consistent across different specifications.  
Descriptive results from this research support the assertions that there has been 
a general trend toward increased within-country inequality in recent history (Graph 1). 
For instance, the average within-country Gini index increased from 46.83 in 1983 to 
54.80 in 1999. Descriptive statistics also reveal that there has been a trend toward 
greater social spending per capita in Latin American countries in the last two decades 
(Graph 2). Likewise, primary and secondary enrollments have increased over the 
decades being studied. The average gross enrollment ratio increased from 52.25 in 
1980, to 56.48 in 1990, to 71.67 in 2000.  
Statistic analysis suggests a negative correlation between social spending and 
inequality, and a positive correlation between education enrollment and inequality. 
However, these correlations don‟t control for other factors that affect income inequality, 
so multiple regressions analysis yield more reliable effects of social spending on income 
inequality. Table 3 shows the correlations among these variables.  
The fixed effects model provides the preferred estimates among the different 
econometric methods used for the analysis. Random effects model gives inconsistent 
estimates which could be the result of the strong assumption about constant correlation 
among errors within counties.  It is very probable that the unobserved effects affect the 
dependent variable in different scale over the time period of the data. First differenced 
GMM estimators are very limited due to the small sample that results once the 
dependent variable and right hand side variables are lagged5.  
Social spending estimates are consistent for every model specification. 
Education and health spending estimates are positive, statistically significant, and almost 
equal. On average estimates indicate that an increase of one dollar in education 
spending reduces index inequality by about 0.6 percentage points, while an increase of 
                                                 
5
 A small sample results because I am using unbalanced panel dataset, and there are a lot of missing values 
in the dependent variable.  
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one dollar in health spending decreases index inequality by about  0.4 percentage 
points. Social security spending seems to have no effect on income inequality. These 
results provide evidence that education and health spending are slightly progressive in 
income. This result by itself is not surprising. In fact, this is the same outcome of most of 
the studies that have analyzed the effect of social spending in income inequality. 
However, estimates from this study differ from previous ones in that the size of the effect 
is lower when we control for endogeneity of the social spending variables. I consider this 
statement the most important result of this study.  
Economic development variables support for Kuznets‟ hypothesis: increased 
economic development tends to increase inequality before a threshold of income is 
reached. After this point the curve turns, so increased development lessens inequality. 
The estimated parameters are almost equal for model 1 and model 2. In model 3, the 
estimated parameters for log of GDP per capita and its square hold the same signs as in 
model 1 and model 2, but they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. That 
is, controlling for the methodology and data used to estimate the Gini index reduces the 
effect of income per capita in income inequality. This result makes sense since income is 
in fact the most important variable to estimate the Gini index. That is, the significative 
effect of income per capital on Gini index is due to the fact that income per capita is used 
to estimate the index and not because the data support Kuznets‟ hypothesis.  
Trade seems to have a negative effect in income inequality, while foreign direct 
investment has a positive but not statistically significant effect.  The negative effect of 
trade is significant at conventional levels and support the hypothesis that education 
spending helps mitigate the adverse effect of openness on income inequality in poorer 
countries, while social security and welfare do not.  
Urbanization has a positive and significant effect on income inequality. This effect 
goes against the hypothesis that growth of the urban population contributes to a higher 
middle class, more employment, and less inequality. It would be interesting to find some 
explanation for this atypical effect. One hypothesis is that the process of urbanization on 
most Latin American countries could be a consequence of total absence of government, 
bad economic conditions, and violence in rural areas, rather than a consequence of 
better economic opportunities of large cities.  That is, forced displacement from rural to 
urban areas could generate higher levels of inequality in urban areas.  
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Aged population estimates are negative but not statistically significant on all 
specifications. Unless we expect a positive coefficient for aged population, a positive 
coefficient makes sense given that Latin America countries are all developing countries 
with a large young population. Hence, the adverse effect of aged population in income 
distribution could not be applicable for these countries.   
When educational variables are considered in Model 2 and 3, secondary and 
tertiary enrollments are significant at conventional levels, yet they have opposite effects 
on income inequality. Secondary enrollments have a negative effect on income 
distribution while tertiary enrollments have a positive effect. These findings support the 
premise that secondary enrollments increase the supply of educated workers and, 
thereby, decrease income inequality. In contrast, higher education increases income 
inequality since it creates a large gap in wages, and it is available only for a small 
percentage of the young population.  
The dummy variables for the variance in methodologies are quite large. In the 
case of the income vs. expenditure dummy, our results indicate that the income based 
studies result in a Gini index that is 11points higher than is the case of expenditure 
based studies. The national dummy suggests that a Gini index based on a national 
sample is 6points higher than one based on urban sample. Finally, the household 
income dummy suggests that a Gini index based on a household income is 2 points 
lower than one based on income per capita.  
Democracy doesn‟t have consistent estimates among specifications, yet it is not 
statistically significant. 
Conclusions  
Many problems arrive when cross country sample are used to analyze 
determinants of income inequality. First, as Huber argued, common estimators of 
inequality such a Gini coefficient don‟t capture the positive benefits of education and 
health spending in the short run. In general, the effect that health and education 
spending has on improving human capital in the bottom half of the income distribution 
would appear only with a considerable lag. Second, there is causality for some of the 
variables that determine income inequality such as social expenditure and income. 
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Third, cross-country data scarcity would not allow to control for most of the endogeneity 
problems that arrive for this specific model.  
This analysis contributes to the literature on the determinants of cross-country 
income inequality and offers new insights into the complex relationships between social 
spending and income inequality. Estimated parameters are consistent and unbiased 
when we control for the endogeneity of social spending in the income inequality 
equation. Results show that models that don‟t take into account endogeneity of the 
social spending variables overestimate the effects of education and health spending. 
From a policy perspective, this research leads valuable insights on the 
distributive effects of expenditures on education and health. On one hand, I found 
evidence that education and health expenditures reduce income inequality in developing 
countries, being more effective education than health spending. On the other hand, I 
found that analogous estimates of the effect of social expenditures on income inequality 
were overestimated because inappropriate econometric methods have been used in 
previous studies.  
Nevertheless, results from this study are not conclusive. The overall estimates of 
social spending found in this study are limited in the sense that the effect of social 
expenditures on income distribution depend on the allocation of these expenditures. 
That is, spending on primary education will be distributive and spending on university 
education regressive, so the greater the share of education spending going to primary 
education, the more progressive the overall impact. The same argument holds for 
different assignments of health expenditures. Problem is that there is not data that 
disaggregate for lower levels of expenditures. Therefore, the overall estimate could be 
misleading.  
Even with the limitations of the data, this research is still able to produce results 
that are valuable on their own, and which also serve as the foundation for more robust 
studies in the future. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary of Gini coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Mean 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Freq. Min Max 
Argentina 44.53 3.00 16 39.8 49.5 
Bolivia 54.70 3.53 10 49.4 60.2 
Brazil 59.19 2.24 17 52.6 64 
Chile 54.86 1.95 19 48.9 57.67 
Colombia 53.35 5.91 15 43.4 63.7 
Costa Rica 46.47 2.05 14 42 48.9 
Dominican Rep. 48.65 2.70 8 43.4 51.6 
Ecuador 51.96 6.00 7 43.7 58.8 
El Salvador 51.91 3.28 8 44.7 56 
Guatemala 55.10 1.01 3 54 56 
Honduras 54.86 2.45 12 50 59.1 
Jamaica 44.96 7.30 12 38.3 65.5 
Mexico 53.57 1.87 6 50.6 55.7 
Nicaragua 55.60 0.14 2 55.5 55.7 
Panama 55.89 3.72 7 47.6 58.4 
Paraguay 51.23 8.18 6 39.8 62.1 
Peru 44.79 9.43 5 31 57 
Uruguay 42.02 1.92 13 38.73 45.62 
Venezuela 45.25 3.17 20 37.52 51.2 
Total 50.48 6.49 200 31 65.5 
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Graph 1.  
Gini Index of Income Inequality for Latin American Countries
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Source: Author‟s estimation 
 
 
 
Graph 2.  
Social Spending for Latin American Countries
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Table 2. Means of Social Spending per capita for Latin American countries 
 
Country Social 
Spending 
Education 
Spending 
Health 
Spending 
Social Security 
Spending 
Argentina 17.81 3.71 4.19 7.28 
Bolivia 7.59 3.79 2.48 2.00 
Brazil 10.52 1.14 2.34 6.18 
Chile 16.21 3.54 2.54 7.45 
Colombia 9.97 3.68 1.91 3.37 
Costa Rica 17.14 4.46 5.48 4.20 
Dominican Rep. 5.42 1.96 1.14 0.54 
Ecuador 10.02 4.19 1.79 2.50 
El Salvador 5.98 2.72 1.66 1.27 
Guatemala 4.70 1.79 1.05 1.40 
Honduras 7.57 4.21 2.35 0.35 
Jamaica 9.67 4.83 2.47 0.73 
Mexico 8.15 3.19 2.57 1.25 
Nicaragua 11.03 4.76 4.37 0.00 
Panama 17.85 5.08 6.33 4.97 
Paraguay 4.77 2.09 0.73 1.77 
Peru 4.58 2.33 0.98 1.04 
Uruguay 18.24 2.77 2.77 12.36 
Venezuela 9.63 4.26 1.54 2.41 
Total 10.40 3.37 2.57 3.55 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 50.48 6.49 31.00 65.50 
Education SS 86.83 71.33 8.90 395.00 
Health SS 76.22 83.63 3.40 386.00 
Social Security SS 122.52 183.85 0.00 943.00 
Primary 105.17 10.91 71.34 154.68 
Secondary 52.42 17.38 18.59 99.18 
Tertiary 19.76 9.38 4.41 48.53 
GDP/cap 2789.34 1755.55 675.20 8423.84 
Urban 62.14 15.38 34.87 91.64 
Democracy 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Pop. <15 37.72 5.54 24.89 47.54 
Pop. >65 4.80 2.16 2.50 12.56 
FDI 2.27 2.63 0.00 16.79 
Trade 40.33 17.60 10.68 95.89 
IMF 770.28 1785.05 0.00 15828.20 
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Table 4. Determinants of Social Spending 
 
Variable Education Spending Health Spending Social Security 
Spending 
Log(GDP/cap) 0.042 
(0.003)*** 
0.040 
(0.002)*** 
0.072 
(0.008)*** 
Trade -0.130 
(0.099) 
-0.385 
(0.089)*** 
-1.349 
(0.363)*** 
FDI -0.900 
(0.484)** 
-0.115 
(0.410) 
-2.570 
(1.339)** 
Debt 0.001 
(0.000)*** 
-0.001 
(0.000)*** 
0.003 
(0.001)*** 
IMF 0.004 
(0.001)*** 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Pop. <15 -1.900 
(0.989)** 
-0.646 
(0.968) 
2.346 
(3.237) 
Democracy -3.442 
(2.554) 
-5.761 
(2.157)*** 
-13.361 
(6.935)** 
Urban -0.116 
(0.587) 
1.144 
(0.546)** 
0.010 
(1.832) 
Debt 5.884 
(0.425)*** 
4.655 
(0.373)*** 
11.532 
(1.230)*** 
Constant -4.657 
(57.736) 
-116.122 
(57.205)** 
-219.685 
(187.479) 
The standard errors are in the brackets: * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
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Table 5. Determinants of Inequality -  MODEL 1 
 
Variable OLS FE RE GMM 
Education SS -0.021 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.02)*** 
-0.05 
(0.02)*** 
-0.05 
(0.02)** 
Health SS 0.013 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.02)* 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.02)*** 
Social Security SS 0.015 
(0.01)*** 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Log(GDP/cap) 57.152 
(15.29)*** 
147.00 
(69.44)** 
63.76 
(36.40)* 
37.76 
(99.71) 
Log(GDP/cap)2 -3.953 
(1.02)*** 
-9.09 
(4.32)** 
-4.38 
(2.34)* 
-2.72 
(6.22) 
Democracy -1.992 
(1.16)* 
-0.26 
(1.03) 
0.75 
(0.91) 
1.98 
(1.53) 
Trade -0.078 
(0.03)*** 
-0.09 
(0.05)* 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.05)* 
FDI 0.597 
(0.13)*** 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.28 
(0.15)* 
0.17 
(0.23) 
Urban 0.093 
(0.05)** 
0.42 
(0.19)** 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.35 
(0.45) 
Pop. >65 -1.711 
(0.32)*** 
-1.51 
(1.63) 
-1.56 
(0.83)* 
4.40 
(4.66) 
Decade -1.921 
(1.08)* 
-1.20 
(1.04) 
-2.28 
(0.84)*** 
2.94 
(1.16)*** 
Constant -147.508 
(56.92)*** 
-559.35 
(274.02)** 
-181.14 
(140.42) 
0.02 
(0.47) 
The standard errors are in the brackets: * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
Model 1 includes socioeconomic and social spending variables. Model 2 represents socioeconomic, social spending, and 
educational variables. Model 3 is a combined model utilizing socioeconomic, social spending, educational variables and 
sample dummy variables.   
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Table 6. Determinants of Inequality  - MODEL 2 
 
Variable OLS FE RE GMM 
Education SS -0.025 
(0.01)** 
-0.071 
(0.02)*** 
-0.024 
(0.02) 
-0.042 
(0.02)* 
Health SS 0.044 
(0.02)*** 
-0.038 
(0.02)* 
0.008 
(0.02) 
-0.047 
(0.02)** 
Social Security SS 0.017 
(0.00)*** 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.011 
(0.01) 
0.008 
(0.01) 
Log(GDP/cap) 28.649 
(19.46) 
161.093 
(71.03)** 
41.119 
(27.94) 
133.169 
(104.95) 
Log(GDP/cap)2 -2.164 
(1.31)* 
-9.996 
(4.44)** 
-2.959 
(1.85) 
-8.205 
(6.51) 
Democracy -0.164 
(1.02) 
0.085 
(1.02) 
0.992 
(0.92) 
1.257 
(1.56) 
Trade -0.066 
(0.02)*** 
-0.103 
(0.05)** 
-0.072 
(0.04)** 
-0.128 
(0.05)*** 
FDI 0.754 
(0.17)*** 
0.120 
(0.18) 
0.440 
(0.17)*** 
0.152 
(0.26) 
Urban 0.185 
(0.07)*** 
0.553 
(0.20)*** 
0.144 
(0.08)* 
1.019 
(0.59)* 
Pop. >65 -2.754 
(0.53)*** 
-0.744 
(1.75) 
-2.494 
(0.70)*** 
7.487 
(4.69) 
Primary -2.483 
(0.99)*** 
-1.284 
(1.03) 
-2.616 
(0.85)*** 
2.425 
(1.15)** 
Secondary -0.147 
(0.06)*** 
-0.263 
(0.10)*** 
-0.158 
(0.07)** 
-0.244 
(0.13)* 
Tertiary 0.083 
(0.07) 
0.160 
(0.08)** 
0.124 
(0.07)* 
0.195 
(0.11)* 
Decade -0.410 
(0.08)*** 
-0.362 
(0.13)*** 
-0.289 
(0.09)*** 
-0.409 
(0.20)** 
Constant -20.966 
(73.71) 
-601.159 
(278.48)** 
-71.984 
(106.27) 
-0.506 
(0.59) 
The standard errors are in the brackets: * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
Model 1 includes socioeconomic and social spending variables. Model 2 represents socioeconomic, social spending, and 
educational variables. Model 3 is a combined model utilizing socioeconomic, social spending, educational variables and 
sample dummy variables.   
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Table 7. Determinants of Inequality -  MODEL 3 
 
Variable OLS FE RE GMM 
Education SS -0.010 
(0.01) 
-0.051 
(0.02)*** 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.034 
(0.02) 
Health SS 0.016 
(0.01) 
-0.045 
(0.02)** 
0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.054 
(0.02)*** 
Social Security SS 0.003 
(0.00) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
0.015 
(0.01) 
Log(GDP/cap) -15.977 
(17.86) 
42.277 
(64.87) 
-14.081 
(17.86) 
65.188 
(106.88) 
Log(GDP/cap)2 0.813 
(1.18) 
-2.569 
(4.06) 
0.704 
(1.19) 
-3.654 
(6.67) 
Democracy 0.417 
(0.71) 
0.089 
(0.89) 
0.509 
(0.72) 
0.160 
(1.57) 
Trade -0.131 
(0.02)*** 
-0.082 
(0.04)** 
-0.126 
(0.02)*** 
-0.121 
(0.05)** 
FDI 0.443 
(0.15)*** 
0.114 
(0.16) 
0.405 
(0.14)*** 
0.261 
(0.27) 
Urban 0.014 
(0.05) 
0.335 
(0.18)* 
-0.005 
(0.05) 
0.981 
(0.58)* 
Pop. >65 -0.285 
(0.50) 
-0.107 
(1.52) 
-0.388 
(0.54) 
7.382 
(4.68) 
Primary -0.820 
(0.67) 
0.234 
(0.92) 
-0.829 
(0.72) 
2.713 
(1.17)** 
Secondary -0.062 
(0.04) 
-0.199 
(0.08)** 
-0.062 
(0.05) 
-0.225 
(0.13)* 
Tertiary 0.121 
(0.05)*** 
0.121 
(0.07)* 
0.128 
(0.05)*** 
0.139 
(0.11) 
Decade -0.345 
(0.07)*** 
-0.262 
(0.11)** 
-0.327 
(0.06)*** 
-0.474 
(0.20)** 
Dummy National 7.931 
(1.38)*** 
6.211 
(1.23)*** 
7.722 
(1.13)*** 
4.126 
(2.68) 
Dummy Household -3.273 
(1.42)** 
-2.512 
(1.19)** 
-3.147 
(1.15)*** 
-4.450 
(1.55)*** 
Dummy Income 11.639 
(1.96)*** 
11.014 
(2.05)*** 
11.849 
(1.59)*** 
(dropped) 
Constant 120.345 
(68.91)* 
-138.702 
(254.69) 
112.713 
(68.37)* 
-0.527 
(0.58) 
The standard errors are in the brackets: * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
Model 1 includes socioeconomic and social spending variables. Model 2 represents socioeconomic, social spending, and 
educational variables. Model 3 is a combined model utilizing socioeconomic, social spending, educational variables and 
sample dummy variables.   
 
